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House prices and credit risk: Evidence from the United States 
Abstract 
This paper investigates the determinants of nonperforming loans (NPL), with a special focus on house price 
fluctuations. Using a panel of U.S. banks, the analysis is carried out across different loan categories and 
different types of banks. It is found that house price fluctuations significantly affect the dynamics of NPL, 
while the magnitude of the impact varies across loan categories and bank types. 
1. Introduction 
The recent subprime mortgage crisis in the United States has demonstrated the key role that the housing 
market plays in destabilizing the financial system. From the late 1990s, there was a sharp increase in the 
subprime mortgages fuelled by low interest rates and lax lending standards. However, while the quality of 
banks' loan portfolios was deteriorating by the constant growth of the subprime mortgages, the default rates 
remained artificially low due to the rapid house price appreciation. The booming house prices and low 
default rates encouraged banks to invest heavily in the real estate market, which eventually led to the 
creation of a speculative real estate bubble. 
The collapse of the real estate bubble exerted enormous pressure on the banks that were highly exposed 
to the real estate market. In particular, many banking institutions suffered from severe liquidity shortages 
due to a sharp increase in their nonperforming real estate loans. In fact, falling house prices undermined 
the value of real estate collaterals, which motivated many subprime mortgage borrowers to default on their 
loan repayments. Higher default rates, in turn, led to credit contraction and tightening of the lending 
standards in banks. As a consequence, the housing demand substantially dropped, while the housing 
supply was increasing due to the rising number of real estate foreclosures. The imbalances between supply 
and demand further reduced house prices and exacerbated deteriorating credit market conditions, which 
severely affected the real economy and led to high default rates across all loan categories. 
Fig. 1 demonstrates the relationship between U.S. house prices, bank lending, and nonperforming loans 
(NPL). It appears that there is a close relationship between house prices, aggregate loan level, and 
aggregate NPL in the U.S. banking system. In other words, rising house prices are associated with 
increased lending and low default rates, while NPL increase substantially when house prices and real 
estate lending drop. In addition, Fig. 1 shows that NPL dynamics vary significantly across loan categories 
and bank types. More specifically, it appears that the impact of house price fluctuations is much higher on 
real estate loans, compared to other loan categories. It also emerges that, compared to savings institutions 
(SI), commercial banks (CB) suffer from higher loan losses in response to deteriorating market conditions. 
Fig. 1. House Price Index, aggregate lending behaviour, and NPL dynamics across loan categories and 




Against this background, it is clear that understanding how house prices affect the quality of loan portfolios 
is of crucial importance to financial institutions and regulators interested in maintaining financial stability. 
Accordingly, this study uses dynamic panel data models to empirically investigate the impact of house price 
fluctuations on the evolution of NPL across U.S. banks. The analysis is further extended by examining if 
this relationship varies across different loan categories and different types of banks. 
This paper complements the existing literature in several ways. First, we specifically examine the impact of 
house price fluctuations on the quality of loan portfolios at bank-level. Available empirical works focus 
primarily on the role of house prices in destabilizing the banking system as a whole (see, e.g., Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2008); Barrell et al. (2010)), while the impact of house prices on the quality of loan portfolios in 
individual banks is less investigated. Closely related to this particular aspect of our analysis, Pan and Wang 
(2013) study the threshold effects of income growth on the relationship between house prices and NPL. 
However, Pan and Wang (2013) only consider the asymmetric impact of house prices on NPL, whereas 
other credit risk determinants may also have asymmetric effects on default rates. In this empirical study, we 
account for potential asymmetric effects of all credit risk determinants on default rates by investigating NPL 
dynamics during different time periods. 
Second, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that investigates how different loan categories 
are affected by house price movements. Using aggregate NPL to examine the relationship between house 
prices and the quality of loan portfolios may be challenged as the composition of loan portfolios varies 
widely across banking institutions (Louzis et al., 2012). In addition, it is evident in Fig. 1 that NPL dynamics 
vary substantially across different loan categories. Therefore, it is essential to investigate the sensitivity of 
different loan categories to house price fluctuations in order to develop an insight for financial regulators to 
provide better regulatory practices for individual banks with different loan portfolio compositions. 
Third, potential differences between determinants of NPL across different types of the U.S. depository 
institutions have remained undetected, despite their important regulatory implications. It is argued that a 
bank's lending policies reflect its risk attitude, which in turn depends on its mission and institutional 
structure (see Salas and Saurina (2002)). Furthermore, as seen in Fig. 1, there are major differences 
between NPL dynamics of CB and SI over time. Therefore, this study adds to the existing credit risk 
literature by examining if the impact of house prices on the evolution of NPL varies across two types of 
depository institutions, namely CB and SI.1 
Finally, another feature of this paper is that we assess the house price-credit risk nexus based on state-
level data and during different macroeconomic conditions. It is argued that the dynamics of house prices 
vary widely both over time and across geographical regions (see, e.g., Mian and Sufi (2009); Holly et al., 
(2010)). In particular, despite the recent boom and bust cycle in U.S. national house prices, the patterns of 
house prices were non-uniform across states. While some states, such as California and Florida, 
experienced substantial changes in the house prices over both boom and bust periods, some states, such 
as Vermont and Montana, only underwent rapid house price appreciation, and some other states, such as 
Georgia and Michigan, only faced large declines over the bust period. These substantial variations in 
regional house prices reflect differences in the housing market supply and demand, which in turn depend 
on demographic and socio-cultural factors, local economic conditions, regional regulations and jurisdictions, 
and local financial systems. Although these factors can contribute markedly to the diversity of credit risk 
within the United States, the impact of time and regional variations in house prices on the evolution of credit 
risk has been largely neglected by the literature. Therefore, we investigate the impact of state-level house 
price fluctuations on the evolution of NPL during different macroeconomic conditions. 
In essence, the empirical results reveal that house prices significantly affect the quality of banks' loan 
portfolios. More specifically, there is a strong negative relationship between changes in house prices and 
evolution of NPL in individual banks, which supports the view that house prices can serve as a key 
macroprudential indicator (see, e.g., Davis and Zhu (2009); Barrell et al. (2010)). We also find that the 
impact of house prices on NPL is more pronounced during adverse economic conditions. In fact, we show 
that most bank-specific and systematic factors have asymmetric impact on loan losses during different 
economic conditions. This important finding complements the credit risk literature as similar studies 
examine the potential asymmetric effects of only one variable on default rates (see, e.g., Marcucci and 
Quagliariello (2009); Pan and Wang (2013)). Furthermore, unlike prior studies in the banking literature, we 
show that the effects of house prices on loan losses vary significantly across different loan categories. More 
specifically, it is shown that falling house prices lead to higher loan losses in real estate loan portfolios, 
implying that banks with higher real estate lending may face greater financial constraints when house 
prices drop. Our empirical results also show that the impact of house prices varies among bank types. In 
particular, we show that CB are more sensitive to falling house prices although SI are traditionally 
mandated to concentrate on residential mortgages. It is also found that the impact of house prices on loan 
losses varies depending upon the quality of loan portfolios. In other words, lower quality loan portfolios are 
more sensitive to house price fluctuations. This particular finding supports the view that there is a circular 
relationship between house prices, bank lending behaviour, and loan losses. Finally, we show that our key 
findings remain unchanged when we assess the robustness of our results by using different house price 
indicators, different econometric methodologies, and alternative model specifications. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides some theoretical background and 
highlights the hypotheses to be tested. In Section 3, the empirical models and estimation procedure are 
introduced. Section 4 describes the data, while Section 5 discusses the empirical results associated with 
each hypothesis. In Section 6 we report findings from further empirical checks. Section 7 concludes. 
2. Empirical hypotheses 
Credit risk analysis is a major issue in the field of banking and finance, and, therefore, it is not surprising 
that the number of theoretical and empirical studies concerning credit risk is relatively large. A main strand 
of research postulates that credit risk is tightly linked to business cycles (see, e.g., Koopman and Lucas 
(2005); Pesaran et al. (2006); Quagliariello (2007)). According to this literature, lending standards and 
borrowers' default and financing policies are closely related to the state of economy in different phases of 
business cycles. More importantly, Marcucci and Quagliariello (2009) show that the impact of business 
cycle on bank credit risk is more pronounced during a macroeconomic downturn. 
In addition to the business cycle, banks' risk exposure is likely to be affected by the housing cycle. On the 
one hand, house price fluctuations may substantially influence the risk-taking behaviour of banks as (i) 
residential mortgage loans typically form a large portion of a bank's aggregate loan portfolio; (ii) real estate 
assets are widely used as collateral for other loans to secure loan repayments (Davis and Zhu, 2009, 
Goodhart and Hofmann, 2008). On the other hand, changes in house prices can largely affect the 
creditworthiness of households and mortgage borrowers as housing is a major component of household 
wealth (Flavin and Yamashita, 2002, Paradiso et al., 2012), and the wealth effects of housing are greater 
than other financial assets (Case et al., 2005). 
In this context, understanding the drivers of housing cycles is of crucial importance as it can shed light on 
the linkage between housing prices and credit risk. In fact, just like any other asset, equilibrium house 
prices are determined by a wide range of factors influencing supply and demand in the housing market. 
Housing supply strongly depends on the real construction costs as well as physical and regulatory 
constraints, while the main drivers of housing demand are macroeconomic fundamentals such as local 
population growth, real disposable income, interest rates, and unemployment rates. Therefore, house 
prices and business cycle may move together (see, e.g., Davis and Heathcote (2005); Leamer (2007)). 
Another factor that plays a central role in the determination of house prices is the credit supply by banks 
(see, e.g., Davis and Zhu (2011)). Indeed, bank lending greatly amplifies the effects of small income shocks 
through the real economy by altering the value of borrowers' net-worth. In an influential paper, Bernanke et 
al. (1996) refer to this amplification mechanism as the “financial accelerator” or “credit multiplier”. The main 
idea behind the financial accelerator is the interplay between borrowers' net worth and their borrowing 
capacity that arises due to credit market imperfections and asymmetric information between lenders and 
borrowers in the credit market. Prospective borrowers are usually required to put up collateral to secure 
their loan repayments, and collateralized assets are often in the form of real estate. Therefore, aggregate 
borrowing capacity of firms and households is associated with house prices. In this context, rising house 
prices increase the value of real estate collaterals and lead to greater net-worth for borrowers, which further 
increase their borrowing capacity (see, e.g., Bernanke and Gertler (1989); Kiyotaki and Moore (1997); 
Iacoviello (2005)). 
The empirical literature presents a two-way relationship between bank lending and house prices: banks 
largely influence house price dynamics through their lending behaviour, while lending policies are greatly 
affected by house price movements (see, e.g., Gerlach and Peng (2005); Mora (2008); Gimeno and 
Martinez-Carrascal (2010)). In this context, the co-movement of bank lending and house prices may imply 
procyclicality in the banking system where most banks may take the same policy actions as they are 
systematically exposed to similar conditions. In particular, the procyclicality and trend-chasing behaviour in 
bank lending may occur in both lending level (Berger and Udell, 2004, Borio et al., 2001) and lending 
concentration (Mei and Saunders, 1997). The procyclicality in bank lending not only increases the speed 
and magnitude of house price fluctuations but also stimulates procyclical default rates (see Marcucci and 
Quagliariello (2008)). In other words, banks that become heavily exposed to the housing market during a 
booming period may severely suffer from high loan losses when house prices drop. This is consistent with 
the idea that risk builds up during booms and materializes during periods of economic downturns (see, e.g., 
Borio and Lowe (2002); Pesola (2011)). 
Furthermore, several studies that examine the causes of the recent subprime mortgage crisis support the 
idea that there is a cyclical relationship between house prices, bank lending, and default rates (see, e.g., 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2008); Hott (2011)). In an influential study, Mian and Sufi (2009) investigate the 
relationship between mortgage credit expansion and default rates using detailed ZIP code-level data. 
Comparing prime and subprime ZIP codes, they show that subprime ZIP codes experienced higher 
mortgage credit growth from 2002 to 2005, which in turn led to higher default rates in subprime ZIP codes 
from 2006. They reveal that unprecedented higher mortgage credit growth was accompanied by higher 
house prices in subprime ZIP codes. In fact, they demonstrate that increased expectations of future house 
price growth, improved income prospects of subprime borrowers, and supply shift in mortgage credit were 
the main drivers of mortgage credit expansion to subprime ZIP codes. 
Against this background, and despite the abundance of theoretical works on house prices and financial 
stability (see, e.g., Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2005); Barrell et al. (2010)), research that follows this 
line of literature is rather silent on the relationship between housing market and default rates at bank-level. 
One exception is the study by Pan and Wang (2013), who analyze the existence of an income growth 
threshold effect in the relationship between house prices and loan losses in U.S. banks. They show that 
house price changes and house price deviations from long-run equilibrium significantly affect NPL, while 
their impact is asymmetric during economic booms and busts. However, the threshold model employed by 
Pan and Wang (2013) can only detect the existence of threshold effects for house prices, whereas other 
credit risk determinants may also have an asymmetric impact on loan losses. More importantly, 
researchers have largely neglected the impact of house price fluctuations on the evolution of NPL across 
different loan categories and bank types. To narrow this gap, we re-examine the relationship between 
house prices and default rates by testing three empirical hypotheses formulated as follows: 
Hypothesis 1 
House price fluctuations heavily affect the quality of banks' loan portfolios. 
Broadly speaking, house price fluctuations largely affect the debt servicing capacity of households and 
mortgage borrowers by altering their collateral position. This in turn influences homeowners' decision 
processes and determines those situations where default becomes the best financial alternative available 
for borrowers (see, e.g., Kau et al. (1994); Daglish (2009)). Moreover, changes in house prices may induce 
substantial spillover effects on the performance of other loan categories as real estate is widely used as 
collateral to secure loan repayments. Thus, it is expected that changes in house prices lead to significant 
variations in a bank's aggregate nonperforming assets. 
Hypothesis 2 
Real estate loans are more sensitive than other types of loans to house price fluctuations. 
Loan categories mainly vary in terms of the type of borrowers and the collateralized assets pledged to 
secure loan repayment. A fall in the market value of collaterals undermines borrowers' equity position, 
which can play a key role in borrowers' decisions to default when they face financial distress. Thus, 
compared to other loan categories, real estate loans are expected to be more sensitive to adverse 
fluctuations in house prices as they are primarily secured by real estate, while other loan types are either 
unsecured or secured with assets other than real estate. 
Hypothesis 3 
House price changes have a non-uniform impact on the quality of loan portfolios of different types of 
depository institutions. 
Lending policies and risk-taking behaviour of banks are highly associated with a wide range of internal 
factors, including a bank's mission, organizational structure, ownership structure, depositor type, regulators, 
and agency problems (see, e.g., Salas and Saurina (2002); Laeven and Levine (2009)). In this context, SI 
greatly vary from CB. In particular, SI are traditionally community-oriented organizations mandated to 
concentrate on residential mortgages to promote home ownership, whereas CB are allowed to make 
various types of loans, including commercial and industrial loans.2 Thus, the impact of house price 
fluctuations on credit risk is expected to be different across these two types of banks. 
3. Model specification 
In this section, the empirical models and econometric methodology are presented. 
3.1. Empirical models 
This study considers the ratio of NPL to total gross loans as proxy for credit risk exposure of banks.3 NPL 
are defined as loans past due for 90 days, or more, and still accruing interest plus loans in nonaccrual 
status. In this case, using a dynamic specification is essential to account for time persistence of NPL (see, 
e.g., Nkusu (2011); Tabak et al. (2011); Louzis et al. (2012)). Accordingly, to test Hypothesis 1, we consider 
the following dynamic model:(1)Rit=αRit−1+Sitβ+Iit−1γ+μi+δt+εitwhere Rit is the credit risk of bank i at time 
t. On the right hand side, α is a scalar, β and γ are vectors of parameters to be estimated, μi is the bank-
specific unobserved heterogeneity, δt is a time dummy to control for cross-sectional dependence, and εit is 
the idiosyncratic disturbance term. The systematic factors affecting credit risk are included in the Sit vector. 
In particular, Sit = [GDPit, IRit, Uit, HPit] where GDPit is the state-level real GDP growth rate, IRit is the real 
lending interest rate, Uit is the state-level unemployment rate, and HPit is the rate of changes in the state-
level real house prices. Finally, Iit = [LCit, LAit, INEit, SIZEit, CRit, NIMit] is a vector of bank-specific 
variables where LCit is the loan concentration ratio,4 LAit is the loan to asset ratio, INEit is the cost to 
income ratio, SIZEit is the log of total assets, CRit is the equity to asset ratio, and NIMit is the net interest 
margin. These variables are consistently used in the literature as the determinants of NPL and credit risk.5 
Following the procedures used in most previous works, this study uses the lagged bank-specific variables 
in modeling NPL (see, e.g., Berger and DeYoung (1997); Davis and Zhu (2009); Tabak et al. (2011); Pan 
and Wang (2013)). In fact, the inclusion of the lagged idiosyncratic variables is essential (i) to avoid 
simultaneity effects between NPL and bank-specific variables; (ii) to account for the potential time delay 
between changes in managerial decisions and changes in the quality of loan portfolios as reported in the 
balance sheet data. 
The two remaining hypotheses can be tested by estimating a simple variant of the model in Eq. (1). For the 
purpose of testing Hypothesis 2, let L be the set of loans and LCk for k = 1,2,3 be the subset of loans in 
three broad loan categories, namely real estate loans, commercial & industrial loans, and consumer loans.6 
Accordingly, NPL can be classified into three broad categories: real estate NPL (RENPL), commercial and 
industrial NPL (CINPL), and consumer NPL (CNPL). Thus, to investigate the impact of house prices on 
NPL of different loan categories, Eq. (1) is modified as follows:(2)R˜it=αR˜it−1+Sitβ+Iit−1γ+μi+δt+εitwhere 
R˜it=Rit|LCk represents the credit risk in each loan category. All other regressors are defined as in Eq. (1). 
As for Hypothesis 3, let Θ be the set of U.S. depository institutions, θ1 = {x ∈ SI ⊂ Θ} be the subset of SI, 
and θ2 = {x ∈ CB ⊂ Θ} be the subset of CB so that θ1∩ θ2 = ∅. That is, each institution is classified as 
either a savings institution or a commercial bank. To examine if the type of an institution is a factor 
influencing the determinants of NPL, Eq. (1) is modified as 
follows:(3)R¯it=αR¯it−1+Sitβ+Iit−1γ+μi+δt+εitwhere R¯it−Rit|θζ,ζ=1,2. This model allows us to investigate 
the sensitivity of credit risk to changes in house prices across different types of depository institutions. 
3.2. Econometric methodology 
To estimate the dynamic models (1), (2), (3), we use the system generalized method of moments (GMM) 
estimator proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998) with a finite sample correction for the two-step covariance 
matrix derived by Windmeijer (2005). Using GMM estimator is essential to deal with the endogeneity of the 
lagged dependent variable. More specifically, as the lagged dependent variable is a function of μi, and, 
therefore, correlated with the error term, μit = μi + δt + εit, preliminary panel data models such as OLS, 
fixed effects, and random effects produce biased and inconsistent estimates (Blundell and Bond, 1998, 
Bond, 2002). To overcome this issue, Arellano and Bond (1991) propose the first-differenced GMM 
estimator, which takes first-differences to remove the unobserved bank-specific effects, μi, and to use 
lagged values of endogenous variables as instruments in the first-differenced equation. 
The first-differenced GMM estimator, however, is likely to perform poorly when the instruments are weak 
(Blundell and Bond, 1998).7 In such cases, as weak instruments become less informative, the first-
differenced GMM estimators suffer from serious downward finite-sample bias, particularly when the number 
of time periods available is small. To address this issue, Blundell and Bond (1998) propose the system 
GMM estimator, which uses the forward orthogonal deviations instead of first-differences. The key idea 
behind the system GMM estimator is to simultaneously estimate a system of two equations: one in first-
differences and the other one in levels. Accordingly, the lagged level values are used to instrument first-
differenced equation, while the lagged first-differenced values are used to instrument the equation in levels. 
Once the instrument matrix is constructed, the two-step system GMM estimator can be calculated. The two-
step GMM estimator is asymptotically more efficient than the one-step estimator, and also relaxes the 
assumption of homoscedasticity in the error terms (see Arellano and Bond (1991); Blundell and Bond 
(1998)). However, due to its dependence on the estimated residuals, the two-step GMM estimator may 
impose a severe downward bias on the estimated standard errors, particularly in small samples (see, Bond 
(2002); Windmeijer (2005)). Therefore, we apply the finite sample correction technique proposed by 
Windmeijer (2005) to provide corrected variance estimates.8 
As the consistency of the system GMM estimators hinges upon the assumption that the instruments are 
exogenous, we consider two specification tests to investigate the reliability of this crucial assumption. The 
first specification test is the Hansen (1982) test of overidentifying restrictions, which evaluates the joint 
validity of the instruments. Under the null hypothesis of valid moment conditions, the Hansen test statistic 
has an asymptotic χ2 distribution (see Arellano and Bond (1991); Arellano and Bover (1995); Blundell and 
Bond (1998)). The second specification test is the Arellano and Bond (1991) test of no serial correlation in 
the first-differenced disturbances. Rejection of the null hypothesis of no serial correlation in the first-
differenced disturbances at an order greater than one suggests that the disturbances are serially 
correlated, which renders the consistency of the GMM estimator (see Arellano and Bond (1991); Roodman 
(2009)). 
Finally, we examine the presence of error cross-section dependence in our regression models.9 It is 
argued that when errors are correlated across panel units, GMM estimators are inconsistent (see Sarafidis 
and Robertson (2009); Sarafidis et al. (2009)). In order to cope with potential error cross-section 
dependence, we include time dummies in our regression models, which is equivalent to cross-sectional 
demeaning of the data. This approach can control for cross-section dependence, unless the impact of 
unobserved common factors differs across panel units (heterogeneous cross-section dependence). To 
investigate whether the cross-sectional dependence in the error term is eliminated after inclusion of time 
dummies we can either rely on AR(2) test or use a Sargan's type difference test proposed by Sarafidis et al. 
(2009). Rejection of the null hypothesis of Sarafidis et al. (2009) test implies heterogeneous cross section 
dependence, thereby inconsistency of GMM estimators. 
4. Data 
Our empirical analysis is based on annual panel data of U.S. banking institutions over the period 1999–
2012. The dataset comprises a combination of macroeconomic and bank-specific variables. Data on NPL 
and other bank-specific variables are obtained from the FDIC database, which provides balance sheet and 
income statement data for individual insured banks in the U.S. banking system. As far as systematic risk 
factors are concerned, data on state-level GDP growth rate and unemployment rate are retrieved from the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) and the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), respectively. Also, the 
interest rate and inflation rate data are obtained from the Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED). Finally, 
the house price data are extracted from the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) database, which 
provides state-level House Price Index (HPI) data.10 Note that house prices, GDP growth rates and 
interest rates are considered in real terms.11 
We then refine the sample by removing banks with less than 6 consecutive observations on all variables. 
This is done to ensure that sufficient data is available for instrumenting endogenous variables when the 
GMM estimator is applied. Furthermore, to ensure that state-level macroeconomic data is available for all 
the sample banks, we only consider the domestic banks and the banks that are headquartered in states. 
The resulting sample is an unbalanced panel consisting of 8367 depository institutions with 106,276 bank-
year observations. 
Table 1 presents the summary statistics of the variables used in this analysis. For each variable, mean, 
median, standard deviation, skewness and kurtosis are reported. It appears that, on average, 1.534% of 
total gross loans in the sample banks are nonperforming. More interestingly, sample banks, on average, 
faced higher NPL in real estate loans, compared to other loan categories. Average HHI for loan 
concentration is 0.610, indicating that loan portfolios of the U.S. banks are concentrated on specific types of 
loans. In addition, loans form, on average, 63.917% of the asset portfolios in the sample banks, meaning 
that the U.S. banks are mainly concentrated on the lending activities. Overall, the sample banks seem to be 
well capitalized as indicated by 10.842% of average capital ratios. However, this indicator has a relatively 
large standard deviation, suggesting that the level of capitalization varies widely among the sample banks. 
Finally, average NIM is 4.047%, indicating that the sample consists of banks with profitable loan portfolios. 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics. 
  
 
Acronym Mean Median Std. 
dev. 
Skewness Kurtosis 
Nonperforming loans NPLit 1.534 0.774 2.456 5.870 82.270 
Real estate NPL RENPLit 1.613 0.660 2.879 5.644 71.504 
Commercial & Industrial 
NPL 
CINPLit 1.469 0.331 3.762 10.661 203.642 
Consumer NPL CNPLit 0.863 0.290 2.306 15.938 453.234 
Loan loss allowance LLAit 1.473 1.287 0.833 3.758 36.185 
Loan concentration LCit 0.610 0.573 0.173 0.625 2.422 
Loan to asset ratio LAit 63.917 65.871 15.584 − 0.706 3.565 
Inefficiency INEit 0.715 0.667 0.414 10.525 189.419 
Size SIZEit 11.875 11.723 1.352 1.148 6.349 
Capital ratio CRit 10.842 9.768 4.916 6.197 76.090 
Net interest margin NIMit 4.047 3.997 1.118 4.460 73.447 
Real GDP growth GDPit 1.875 1.970 2.402 − 0.377 4.856 
Real interest rate IRit 3.050 3.041 1.733 0.103 1.763 
Unemployment rate Uit 5.647 5.233 1.940 1.034 3.826 
Real house price growth HPit 0.701 1.113 4.945 0.095 5.775 
 
 
5. Empirical results 
In this section, we empirically test the hypotheses in Section 2. We first test Hypothesis 1 using model (1), 
and then we test the second and third hypotheses using models (2), (3), respectively. 
In order to investigate the potential asymmetric impact of house prices on the evolution of NPL during 
different economic conditions, we split the sample into two sub-sample periods, 1999–2005 and 2006–
2012. Accordingly, each equation is estimated over three time periods: the full sample period and the sub-
sample periods. Furthermore, investigating the impact of state-level house prices on NPL may be 
challenged as some banks have spread their branches across state borders after the relaxation of 
branching restrictions.12 One may expect banks operating in multiple states to be less exposed to 
economic conditions of the state in which they are headquartered. To take this important feature of the data 
into account, we distinguish between banks that operate in one state, known as intrastate banks, and 
banks that operate in multiple states, known as interstate banks. In doing so, we refer to the Summary of 
Deposits (SOD) database, provided by the FDIC, and divide the sample banks into intrastate and interstate 
banks based on the geographical distribution of their deposit-taking branches. Therefore, each model is 
first estimated for all the depository institutions, and then a separate estimation is carried out for intrastate 
banks only.13 
Table 2 presents the estimation results for model (1). Results are reported for three pairs of equations, 
corresponding to three sampling periods. Equations I and II represent the results for the full sample period, 
1999–2012; equations III and IV show the estimation results for the first sub-sample period, 1999–2005, 
while equations V and VI correspond to the second sub-sample period, 2006–2012. In addition, within each 
pair of equations, the first equation represents the results for all the sample banks, while the second 
equation corresponds to the intrastate banks only. 
Table 2. GMM estimation results for NPL in the U.S. depository institutions. 
 
 
I II III IV V VI 
 
1999–2012 1999–2005 2006–2012 
Regressors All banks Intrastate All banks Intrastate All banks Intrastate 
NPLit − 1 0.689***0.020 0.692***0.021 0.608***0.069 0.610***0.070 0.704***0.023 0.712***0.022 
GDPit −0.041***0.003 −0.039***0.003 −0.019***0.003 −0.019***0.003 −0.042***0.005 −0.038***0.005 
IRit 0.035***0.004 0.035***0.005 0.027***0.006 0.029***0.006 0.066***0.008 0.065***0.008 
Uit 0.102***0.008 0.099***0.008 0.033***0.008 0.038***0.008 0.081***0.009 0.078***0.009 
HPit −0.051***0.002 −0.051***0.002 −0.010***0.002 −0.011***0.002 −0.068***0.005 −0.069***0.005 
LCit − 1 0.425***0.053 0.405***0.056 −0.115**0.049 −0.099**0.048 0.632***0.105 0.629***0.113 
LAit − 1 0.008***0.001 0.008***0.001 0.003***0.001 0.003***0.001 0.009***0.001 0.009***0.001 
INEit − 1 0.0410.041 0.0060.031 −0.090***0.032 −0.112***0.037 0.0310.149 −0.1030.115 
SIZEit − 1 0.035***0.007 0.034***0.008 −0.046***0.010 −0.053***0.012 0.054***0.014 0.034**0.014 
CRit − 1 −0.005**0.002 −0.0040.003 0.004***0.001 0.003*0.002 −0.0010.006 0.0020.006 
NIMit − 1 0.040***0.010 0.038***0.010 0.037***0.009 0.041***0.009 0.040**0.020 0.032*0.018 
Constant −1.289***0.113 −1.235***0.114 0.487***0.201 0.554***0.213 −1.820***0.282 −1.473***0.247 
# 
observation 
97,898 91,497 50,557 48,164 36,283 33,143 
# banks 8367 7821 7337 6986 6081 5554 
AR(1) p-
value 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR(2) p-
value 
0.779 0.913 0.582 0.552 0.844 0.924 
Hansen p-
value 
0.194 0.197 0.154 0.147 0.115 0.264 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is the ratio of nonperforming loans to total gross loans. All the U.S. banks 
are considered in equations I, III, and V, while equations II, IV, and VI present estimation results for 
intrastate banks. All equations are estimated using a dynamic two-step system GMM estimator proposed 
by Blundell and Bond (1998) with Windmeijer's (2005) finite sample correction. All equations include time 
dummies. Huber–White robust standard errors are reported in the parenthesis. ***, **, and * coefficients are 
statistically significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
From Table 2 it appears that the estimated coefficients of the house price fluctuations are negative and 
statistically significant in all the equations. These empirical results support Hypothesis 1 that the quality of 
loan portfolios is highly sensitive to house price fluctuations. In other words, rising house prices improve the 
debt servicing capacity of borrowers, whereas falling house prices may reduce the value of underlying 
collaterals and induce higher default rates. More importantly, the estimated coefficients of house price 
fluctuations are approximately six times higher in the second sub-sample period, compared to those in the 
first sub-sample period. It indicates that rising house prices slightly reduce credit risk, while falling house 
prices trigger a large increase in NPL. This empirical evidence is consistent with the finding of Pan and 
Wang (2013) that house price fluctuations have asymmetric effects on NPL. One potential explanation is 
that rising house prices are often associated with low default rates, excessive lending by banks, and high 
credit demand from risky investors with optimistic expectations about the future of house prices. Excessive 
risk accumulation heavily exposes banks to the housing market, and, as a result, banks suffer severely 
from high loan losses when house prices drop. 
As far as other macroeconomic factors are concerned, from Table 2, it appears that the estimated 
coefficients for the unemployment rate and real interest rate are positive and statistically significant across 
all the periods. As expected, a rise in unemployment and borrowing costs reduces the households' 
disposable income and their ability to service their debts. Similarly, it appears that the impact of the real 
GDP growth on NPL is negative and statistically significant across all the periods, suggesting that positive 
income shocks translate into lower credit risk. However, the impact of all the macroeconomic variables on 
NPL is a few times higher during the second sub-sample period, which has been characterized by adverse 
macroeconomic conditions. These results support the empirical findings of Marcucci and Quagliariello 
(2009) that the business cycle has asymmetric effects on bank credit risk. 
As for the internal factors, we obtain positive and statistically significant coefficients for the lagged NPL 
across all the equations in Table 2. However, the results show that, compared to the first sub-sample 
period, the estimated coefficients are higher during the second sub-sample period, indicating that NPL is 
more persistent and sticky during macroeconomic downturns. Our empirical results also reveal that the 
estimated coefficients of LCit are significant across all the periods, but they obtain different signs in the two 
sub-sample periods: positive in the first period and negative in the second period. One possible explanation 
for this result is that a higher loan portfolio concentration typically indicates a higher ratio of real estate 
loans to total gross loans in most U.S. banks. Therefore, banks with higher ratio of real estate loans to total 
loans may experience less default rates when the house prices are rising, while they suffer dramatically 
from high NPL during adverse house price movements. 
Consistent with the empirical results of Davis and Zhu (2009), the estimated coefficient of LAit is always 
positive and significant. This indicates that banks with more reliance on their interest income have less 
liquidity and face higher default rates than their counterparts with more diversified sources of income. The 
sign of the net interest margin is positive and significant in all the periods, suggesting that higher NIMit is 
associated with riskier portfolios (see also Quagliariello (2007)). Finally, the impact of bank size on NPL 
varies across different periods under consideration. Smaller banks suffer from higher NPL levels during the 
first sub-sample period, implying that smaller banks have less market power, less economies of scale, and 
less diversification among their customers and products (see Salas and Saurina (2002)). Nonetheless, 
larger banks suffer from higher NPL during the second sub-sample period, which may be attributed to 
higher agency costs and more difficulties in monitoring the quality of loan portfolios in large institutions. 
Looking at the estimated parameters in Table 2, it appears that the empirical results for all the sample 
banks are very similar to those of the intrastate banks. In other words, the exclusion of the interstate banks 
from the sample banks does not have a marked impact on the estimation results. This is mainly because 
the number of intrastate banks in the sample is relatively large, and, therefore, the full sample results are 
mainly driven by the intrastate banks. 
In Table 2, we also report the results for the Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions and Arellano and 
Bond (1991) test for the first and second order autocorrelation in the first-difference residuals. Results show 
that the instruments are valid, and that the null hypothesis of no serial correlation cannot be rejected. 
Furthermore, using the Sargan's type difference test proposed by Sarafidis et al. (2009), we did not find any 
strong evidence of cross-sectional dependence in the error term. In summary, the empirical results strongly 
support Hypothesis 1 that there is a strong relationship between credit risk and house price fluctuations. 
Our empirical results also reveal that the impact of house prices on the evolution of NPL is stronger during 
economic downturns. 
We now test Hypothesis 2, which postulates that different loan categories respond differently to house price 
fluctuations. Table 3 presents the system GMM estimation results of model (2) for RENPL. It emerges that 
the estimated coefficients of the house price fluctuations are negative and significant across all the 
equations, suggesting that house prices remarkably affect the evolution of real estate NPL in different 
economic conditions. More importantly, the impact of house prices on the quality of real estate loans is 
much stronger during the second period, indicating an asymmetric relationship between house prices and 
RENPL. The results also reveal that the real estate NPL are highly sensitive to other systematic factors, 
while the impact of macroeconomic factors on the RENPL is more pronounced during the second period. 
As regards the bank-specific factors, it appears that the quality of real estate loans is highly affected by LAit 
SIZEit and NIMit. 
Table 3. GMM estimation results for RENPL. 
 
 
I II III IV V VI 
 
1999–2012 1999–2005 2006–2012 
Regressors All banks Intrastate All banks Intrastate All banks Intrastate 
RENPLit − 1 0.714***0.028 0.721***0.030 0.660***0.069 0.671***0.069 0.672***0.027 0.685***0.028 
GDPit −0.051***0.004 −0.049***0.005 −0.026***0.005 −0.027***0.005 −0.048***0.006 −0.045***0.007 
IRit 0.036***0.006 0.036***0.006 0.034***0.008 0.034***0.008 0.079***0.011 0.080***0.011 
Uit 0.097***0.011 0.092***0.012 0.039***0.010 0.042***0.011 0.099***0.012 0.093***0.013 
HPit −0.062***0.003 −0.062***0.003 −0.009***0.003 −0.009***0.002 −0.094***0.007 −0.096***0.007 
LCit − 1 0.448***0.067 0.441***0.072 −0.0660.065 −0.0230.060 0.526***0.141 0.574***0.154 
LAit − 1 0.006***0.001 0.007***0.001 0.002**0.001 0.002**0.001 0.007***0.002 0.006***0.002 
INEit − 1 0.0540.060 −0.0040.047 −0.120**0.047 −0.165***0.057 0.0520.151 −0.0900.121 
SIZEit − 1 0.055***0.009 0.046***0.011 −0.059***0.014 −0.075***0.019 0.084***0.018 0.047**0.019 
CRit − 1 −0.0040.004 −0.0030.005 0.005*0.003 0.005*0.003 −0.0050.009 −0.0010.010 
NIMit − 1 0.095***0.015 0.095***0.015 0.052***0.012 0.053***0.013 0.144***0.033 0.144***0.033 
Constant −1.630***0.163 −1.490***0.169 0.583**0.284 0.748**0.326 −2.361***0.373 −1.860***0.358 
# 
observation 
84,478 78,315 39,763 37,531 31,334 28,264 
# banks 6937 6415 5758 5431 5249 4734 
AR(1) p-
value 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR(2) p-
value 
0.649 0.699 0.198 0.189 0.489 0.476 
Hansen p-
value 
0.288 0.258 0.441 0.449 0.267 0.291 
 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is the ratio of real estate nonperforming loans to total gross real estate 
loans. All the U.S. banks are considered in eq uations I, III, and V, while equations II, IV, and VI present 
estimation results for intrastate banks. All equations are estimated using a dynamic two-step system GMM 
estimator proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998) with Windmeijer's (2005) finite sample correction. All 
equations include time dummies. Huber–White robust standard errors are reported in the parenthesis. ***, 
**, and * coefficients are statistically significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
Our estimation results of model (2) for CINPL are reported in Table 4. It appears that the estimated 
coefficients of house price changes are insignificant during the first period. However, house prices 
significantly contribute to the CINPL in the second sub-period, perhaps due to spillover effects of the falling 
house prices and the deterioration of the aggregate liquidity position in the financial system. In addition, the 
commercial and industrial NPL are highly affected by other systematic factors in the first sub-sample 
period, while the impact of these factors weakens during the second period. It is also revealed that SIZEit is 
the only institutional factor that significantly contributes to the CINPL. Bank size obtains negative 
coefficients across all the equations, which reflects economies of scale, better diversification of customers 
and products, and better risk management in larger banks (see also Salas and Saurina (2002)). 
Table 4. GMM estimation results for CINPL. 
  
 
I II III IV V VI 
 
1999–2012 1999–2005 2006–2012 
Regressors All banks Intrastate All banks Intrastate All banks Intrastate 
CINPLit − 1 0.317**0.135 0.332**0.148 0.350***0.034 0.352***0.035 0.472***0.114 0.452***0.120 
GDPit −0.017***0.006 −0.017***0.006 −0.016**0.008 −0.016**0.008 −0.0130.011 −0.0080.012 
IRit 0.027***0.010 0.027***0.010 0.072***0.015 0.075***0.016 0.039**0.017 0.045**0.018 
Uit 0.130***0.020 0.126***0.022 0.125***0.022 0.137***0.023 0.130***0.022 0.133***0.023 
HPit −0.024***0.003 −0.023***0.003 0.0010.005 0.0030.006 −0.031***0.009 −0.034***0.010 
LCit − 1 0.688*0.398 0.6190.413 0.775***0.268 0.897***0.300 0.7810.534 0.9380.651 
LAit − 1 0.005**0.002 0.005**0.002 0.0020.002 0.0020.002 0.008**0.003 0.007**0.003 
INEit − 1 0.185**0.090 0.164*0.092 0.1530.217 0.1320.227 0.568*0.341 0.4960.372 
SIZEit − 1 −0.108***0.033 −0.122***0.045 −0.202***0.025 −0.252***0.033 −0.153***0.041 −0.214***0.062 
CRit − 1 −0.017**0.007 −0.016**0.008 0.0100.009 0.0090.009 0.0030.011 −0.0020.011 
NIMit − 1 0.0330.024 0.0350.021 0.0170.022 0.0170.022 −0.0100.029 −0.0040.030 
Constant 0.893**0.427 1.035*0.551 1.899***0.430 2.328***0.505 0.6990.504 1.483**0.670 
# 
observations 
73,204 67,621 29,803 27,956 19,261 16,862 
# banks 6096 5628 4312 4402 3223 2821 
AR(1) p-
value 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR(2) p-
value 
0.297 0.320 0.924 0.914 0.192 0.423 
Hansen p-
value 
0.162 0.165 0.336 0.328 0.382 0.282 
 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is the ratio of commercial & industrial nonperforming loans to total 
commercial & industrial loans. All the U.S. banks are considered in equations I, III, and V, while equations 
II, IV, and VI present estimation results for intrastate banks. All equations are estimated using a dynamic 
two-step system GMM estimator proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998) with Windmeijer's (2005) finite 
sample correction. All equations include time dummies. Huber–White robust standard errors are reported in 
the parenthesis. ***, **, and * coefficients are statistically significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
As for the consumer NPL, the estimation results in Table 5 show that the CNPL determinants are rather 
different from those of other loan categories. Notably, none of the systematic factors remarkably affect the 
quality of consumer loans during the first sub-sample period, while GDPit, IRit, and HPit contribute to the 
CNPL in the second period. This implies that unexpected shocks arising from falling house prices and 
adverse economic growth largely affect the borrowers' wealth in the second period. Consequently, 
borrowers can no longer use their wealth as a buffer to service their debts (see, e.g., Rinaldi and Sanchis-
Arellano (2006); Nkusu (2011)). Among bank-specific variables, LCit, and SIZEit are the only institutional 
factors that significantly contribute to the CNPL in all the periods. The estimated coefficients of bank size 
are negative and significant, implying better diversification and more scale efficiency in larger banks. Also, 
positive coefficients of LCit suggest that banks with more concentrated loan portfolios may suffer from 
higher CNPL. 
Table 5. GMM estimation results for CNPL. 
 
I II III IV V VI 
 
1999–2012 1999–2005 2006–2012 
Regressors All banks Intrastate All banks Intrastate All banks Intrastate 
CNPLit − 1 0.316***0.086 0.346***0.095 0.232**0.107 0.219**0.108 0.380***0.121 0.352***0.132 
GDPit −0.013***0.004 −0.014***0.004 −0.0010.004 −0.0010.004 −0.017***0.006 −0.019***0.006 
IRit 0.010**0.005 0.010**0.005 0.0100.009 0.0080.010 0.018**0.009 0.019*0.010 
Uit 0.019***0.006 0.019***0.006 0.0210.014 0.029*0.015 0.0140.010 0.0140.011 
HPit −0.0010.002 −0.0010.002 −0.0010.004 0.0020.005 −0.012*0.007 −0.014*0.008 
LCit − 1 0.217**0.090 0.216**0.100 0.667***0.213 0.792***0.232 0.747***0.241 0.934***0.276 
LAit − 1 0.003***0.001 0.003***0.001 0.0010.001 0.0010.001 −0.0020.002 −0.0020.002 
INEit − 1 −0.0700.065 −0.0990.067 −0.1400.173 −0.2400.184 0.0730.133 −0.0030.151 
SIZEit − 1 −0.051***0.011 −0.063***0.015 −0.162***0.028 −0.207***0.036 −0.080***0.026 −0.132***0.039 
CRit − 1 −0.0010.004 −0.0020.004 0.010**0.004 0.010**0.005 0.0090.008 0.0030.006 
NIMit − 1 0.0010.010 −0.0040.011 0.0100.016 0.0080.017 0.0250.024 0.0190.025 
Constant 0.696***0.167 0.847***0.209 2.215***0.494 2.683***0.578 1.005***0.330 1.682***0.431 
# 
observations 
77,095 71,631 36,809 34,807 20,347 18,184 
# banks 6434 5973 5330 5036 3404 3042 
AR(1) p-
value 
0.000 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.001 
AR(2) p-
value 
0.225 0.235 0.127 0.143 0.992 0.929 
Hansen p-
value 




Notes: The dependent variable is the ratio of consumer nonperforming loans to total gross consumer loans. 
All the U.S. banks are considered in eq uations I, III, and V, while equations II, IV, and VI present 
estimation results for intrastate banks. All equations are estimated using a dynamic two-step system GMM 
estimator proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998) with Windmeijer's (2005) finite sample correction. All 
equations include time dummies. Huber–White robust standard errors are reported in the parenthesis. ***, 
**, and * coefficients are statistically significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
Summarizing, we find clear support for Hypothesis 2, which postulates that, compared to other loan 
categories, real estate loans are more sensitive to house price fluctuations. We also provide empirical 
evidence that all loan categories are highly sensitive to house price changes during economic downturns. 
Comparing different loan categories, we find that real estate loans are the most sensitive category to 
GDPit, which is typically considered as the main proxy for business cycle fluctuations. The RENPL are also 
the most persistent category of NPL. Finally, the sensitivity of the NPL to various institutional factors varies 
among different loan categories. 
We now extend our analysis to different types of depository institutions. In order to do so, we follow the 
FDIC charter type classification and split the depository institutions in our sample into commercial and SI. 
The two types of institutions are functionally similar as they both accept deposits and issue loans. However, 
SI are traditionally community oriented organizations that specialize in mortgage lending, whereas CB 
make various types of loans including commercial and industrial loans.14 
The GMM estimation results for the commercial and SI are presented in Table 6, Table 7, respectively. 
From Table 6 it emerges that the quality of loan portfolios of the CB is highly sensitive to the house price 
movements. Notably, the estimated coefficients of HPit are negative and statistically significant across all 
the periods. In addition, all other macroeconomic factors as well as some bank-specific factors, such as 
LCit, LAit, and SIZEit, significantly contribute to the NPL in CB. 
Table 6. GMM estimation results for NPL in the U.S. commercial banks. 
 
 
I II III IV V VI 
 
1999–2012 1999–2005 2006–2012 
Regressors All banks Intrastate All banks Intrastate All banks Intrastate 
NPLit − 1 0.683***0.023 0.666***0.023 0.663***0.079 0.661***0.080 0.696***0.025 0.696***0.024 
GDPit −0.039***0.003 0.666***0.023 −0.020***0.004 −0.021***0.004 −0.043***0.005 −0.039***0.005 
IRit 0.036***0.005 0.035***0.005 0.034***0.006 0.034***0.006 0.068***0.008 0.065***0.009 
Uit 0.096***0.008 0.099***0.008 0.034***0.008 0.036***0.009 0.071***0.009 0.071***0.009 
HPit −0.052***0.002 −0.053***0.002 −0.008***0.002 −0.008***0.002 −0.069***0.006 −0.069***0.006 
LCit − 1 0.727***0.071 0.690***0.076 −0.228***0.054 −0.209***0.060 1.139***0.142 1.092***0.156 
LAit − 1 0.009***0.001 0.008***0.001 0.004***0.001 0.004***0.001 0.010***0.001 0.010***0.001 
INEit − 1 0.0120.024 0.0090.025 −0.172***0.044 −0.180***0.044 −0.0170.081 −0.0060.089 
SIZEit − 1 0.031***0.007 0.030***0.008 −0.040***0.012 −0.048***0.015 0.040***0.013 0.026*0.015 
CRit − 1 −0.0010.002 −0.0010.003 0.004**0.002 0.004**0.002 0.0040.007 0.0060.007 
NIMit − 1 0.0080.008 0.0090.009 0.037***0.009 0.037***0.009 −0.0180.016 −0.0110.016 
Constant −1.294***0.099 −1.276***0.106 0.422***0.205 0.492***0.235 −1.688***0.214 −1.547***0.229 
# 
observations 
82,427 77,666 42,534 40,800 30,447 28,040 
# banks 7056 6652 6173 5919 5101 4698 
AR(1) p-
value 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR(2) p-
value 
0.239 0.430 0.171 0.175 0.997 0.948 
Hansen p-
value 
0.179 0.201 0.165 0.169 0.159 0.288 
 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is the ratio of nonperforming loans to total gross loans. All the U.S. 
commercial banks are considered in equations I, III, and V, while equations II, IV, and VI present estimation 
results for intrastate commercial banks. All equations are estimated using a dynamic two-step system GMM 
estimator proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998) with Windmeijer's (2005) finite sample correction. All 
equations include time dummies. Huber–White robust standard errors are reported in the parenthesis. ***, 
**, and * coefficients are statistically significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
Table 7. GMM estimation results for NPL in the U.S. savings institutions. 
 
 
I II III IV V VI 
 
1999–2012 1999–2005 2006–2012 
Regressors All banks Intrastate All banks Intrastate All banks Intrastate 
NPLit − 1 0.695***0.044 0.712***0.045 0.718***0.100 0.708***0.099 0.767***0.039 0.763***0.060 
GDPit −0.038***0.009 −0.044***0.011 −0.016**0.007 −0.014*0.008 −0.047***0.011 −0.042***0.012 
IRit 0.043***0.011 0.038***0.012 0.028*0.016 0.0280.017 0.067***0.019 0.067**0.021 
Uit 0.136***0.021 0.112***0.021 0.037**0.017 0.044**0.019 0.085***0.019 0.087***0.028 
HPit −0.049***0.004 −0.048***0.004 −0.015***0.003 −0.015***0.003 −0.059***0.012 −0.061***0.013 
LCit − 1 0.313*0.172 0.494**0.201 0.170*0.087 0.191*0.099 0.4120.265 0.664*0.341 
LAit − 1 0.003*0.002 0.002**0.001 0.0010.001 0.0010.001 0.0040.003 0.0030.003 
INEit − 1 0.1290.162 −0.0380.134 0.0170.030 0.0270.039 0.2620.514 −0.4780.405 
SIZEit − 1 0.045**0.022 0.0310.025 −0.021*0.012 −0.026*0.015 0.092*0.048 0.0240.043 
CRit − 1 −0.014*0.008 −0.017*0.009 −0.0030.003 −0.0040.003 −0.0040.011 −0.0080.014 
NIMit − 1 0.158**0.064 0.172**0.069 0.066*0.038 0.080*0.043 0.284***0.108 0.207*0.108 
Constant −1.618***0.481 −1.437***0.486 −0.1070.262 −0.1110.299 −3.021**1.288 −1.4441.098 
# 
observations 
15,471 13,831 8023 7364 5836 5103 
# banks 1311 1169 1164 1067 980 856 
AR(1) p-
value 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR(2) p-
value 
0.578 0.551 0.187 0.124 0.492 0.345 
Hansen p-
value 
0.231 0.255 0.134 0.171 0.249 0.195 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is the ratio of nonperforming loans to total gross loans. All the U.S. savings 
institutions are considered in equations I, III, and V, while equations II, IV, and VI present estimation results 
for intrastate savings institutions. All equations are estimated using a dynamic two-step system GMM 
estimator proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998) with Windmeijer's (2005) finite sample correction. All 
equations include time dummies. Huber–White robust standard errors are reported in the parenthesis. ***, 
**, and * coefficients are statistically significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
From Table 7, however, it appears that the NPL dynamics are rather in the SI. Unlike CB, SI are less 
sensitive to the institutional factors. More specifically, none of the bank-specific variables has a remarkable 
impact on NPL in the SI. However, the estimated coefficients of the lagged dependent variables are slightly 
higher in the SI, suggesting that NPL are more persistent in SI. As regards the systematic factors, it is 
found that the quality of loan portfolios of the SI is significantly affected by the macroeconomic variables. In 
particular, the NPL dynamics in the SI are highly sensitive to the business cycle (see also Salas and 
Saurina (2002)). The results also show that the impact of the macroeconomic factors on NPL is stronger in 
the second period, which is consistent with the findings of Marcucci and Quagliariello (2009). 
As in the case of CB, the estimated coefficients of HPit are negative and statistically significant in all the 
equations when SI are considered. However, compared to the CB, the impact of HPit on the NPL in the SI 
is higher during the first period and lower in the second period. This indicates that CB are more sensitive to 
house price developments in downturns. One possible explanation is that, like SI, CB become heavily 
exposed to the housing markets during a booming period. However, CB do not specialize in mortgage 
lending and may invest in riskier real estate loans. Accordingly, CB may suffer from higher loan losses 
when house prices drop. The results in Table 7 also show that the impact of house prices on the NPL is 
stronger during the second period for both types of banks, which lends support to the findings of Pan and 
Wang (2013), who show that the impact of house price fluctuations on credit risk is stronger when the 
growth of personal income falls below a certain threshold level. 
In light of these results, we conclude that house price fluctuations significantly affect the quality of loan 
portfolios across the two types of institutions, while the magnitude of the impact varies across commercial 
and SI during different macroeconomic conditions. These results represent evidence in favor of Hypothesis 
3. 
6. Further empirical checks 
6.1. Quality loan portfolios, house prices, and loan losses 
Several studies, including Mian and Sufi (2009) and Hott (2011), argue that rising house prices increase 
lenders expectations of future house price growth, which in turn may encourage them to direct credit 
towards subprime borrowers. As a consequence, banks suffer from high default rates in the subsequent 
years due to a significant worsening of the quality of loan portfolios.15 To examine if the quality of loan 
portfolios influences the relationship between house prices and default rates, we use loan loss allowance 
(LLA) as a proxy for the amount of subprime loans (or loans that are expected to default) in a bank's loan 
portfolio. In fact, LLA is the amount of reserves that a bank must maintain to cover its estimated credit 
losses on loans due to defaults and non-payment. Accordingly, our empirical models are augmented by 
including an interaction term between loan loss allowance and house prices. Besides, since the interaction 
term may be highly correlated with house prices, we run separate regressions by including the interaction 
term but without house price fluctuations. Using the interaction term allows us to investigate if the impact of 
house prices on default rates varies at different levels of loan loss allowance. In other words, we can 
examine if banks with deteriorating loan portfolios are more sensitive to house price fluctuations. Estimation 
results are presented in Table 8. In order to save space, we only present the estimates of house price 
fluctuations and the interaction term.16 From Table 8 it appears that the interaction between house price 
fluctuations and loan loss allowance significantly affects aggregate NPL in all institutions, CB, and SI, while 
the impact is insignificant when separate loan categories are considered. This indicates that banks with 
higher subprime loans suffer from higher default rates when house prices drop. Furthermore, these results 
broadly support our previous findings regarding the impact of house prices on NPL. In particular, it is found 
that house price fluctuations significantly affect NPL, while real estate loans (among loan categories) and 
CB (among bank types) are more sensitive to falling house prices. 






Variable Variables With HP Without HP 
All institutions NPLit HPit −0.040***0.003 
 
NPLit HPit × LLAit − 1 −0.013***0.002 −0.014***0.002 
Commercial banks NPLit HPit −0.040***0.003 
 
NPLit HPit × LLAit − 1 −0.013***0.002 −0.014***0.002 
Savings institutions NPLit HPit −0.038***0.007 
 
NPLit HPit × LLAit −0.010*0.006 −0.032***0.006 
Real estate loans RENPLit HPit −0.075***0.003 
 
RENPLit − 1 HPit × LLAit − 1 −0.0010.001 −0.0020.002 
Commercial loans CINPLit HPit −0.020***0.003 
 





Variable Variables With HP Without HP 
Consumer loans CNPLit HPit −0.0040.003 
 
CNPLit HPit × LLAit − 1 −0.0020.002 −0.003*0.002 
 
Notes: All equations are estimated over the period 1999–2012 and by using a dynamic two-step system 
GMM estimator proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998) with Windmeijer's (2005) finite sample correction. 
Huber–White robust standard errors are reported in the parenthesis. ***, **, and * coefficients are 
statistically significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. The detailed results with other explanatory 
variables are available from the authors upon request. 
6.2. Alternative house price indicators 
We now assess the robustness of our empirical results set out above by employing three alternative 
measures of house price fluctuations. One possible alternative to state-level house price fluctuations are 
changes in house prices at metropolitan statistical area (MSA) level. In fact, previous studies regarding the 
impact of house prices on the performance of U.S. banks have used both state-level house prices (see 
Berger and Bouwman (2015)) and MSA-level house prices (see Pan and Wang (2013); Favara and Imbs 
(2015)). Our main analysis, however, is based on state-level house prices for two important reasons: (i) to 
use MSA-level data, the sample should be reduced to MSA banks (banks that are headquartered in 
metropolitan statistical areas), meaning that a large number of non-MSA banks are dropped from the 
sample, (ii) many U.S. banks, particularly MSA banks, operate in more than one MSA, which may imply 
that they are less affected by house prices in the MSA where their headquarters are located. The FHFA 
provides data for two types of house price indices: a purchase only index that is calculated based on 
purchases and an all transaction index that is calculated based on both purchases and appraisals. So far, 
we have used the purchase only index as lending policies are mainly affected by purchases rather than 
appraisals (see Berger and Bouwman (2015)). Nonetheless, we can use all transaction House Price Index 
as an alternative to purchase-only house prices in order to assess the robustness of our main results. The 
last potential concern relates to the possibility that default rates are affected by longer-term house price 
fluctuations. In fact, borrowers' decisions to default may be influenced by house price movements over a 
longer period. Therefore, we consider the percentage change in the house prices from year t − 2 to year t 
as the third alternative to our main house price indicator. 
Using these three alternative house price indicators, we re-estimate models (1), (2), (3) and report the 
results in Table 9. In order to save space, we only report the estimates of house price indicators.17 From 
Table 9 it appears that most estimated coefficients are consistent in terms of sign and statistical 
significance with those obtained using state-level purchase-only house price fluctuations. In particular, 
regardless of which indicator is employed, the results reveal that changes in house prices have a negative 
and significant impact on default rates, while the impact is more pronounced during economic downturn. 
Similar results are obtained when comparing loan portfolios. More specifically, the effects of house prices 
on NPL vary across loan categories, with real estate loans being the most responsive category. 
Furthermore, in line with our previous finding, the results show that CB are more sensitive to falling house 
prices, compared to SI. Overall, the empirical results presented in Table 9 strongly support the robustness 
of our key findings regarding the effects of house prices on loan losses. 














All institutions NPLit 1999–
2012 
−0.0571***0.003 −0.053***0.003 −0.049***0.003 
NPLit 1999–
2005 





















−0.055***0.004 −0.050***0.003 −0.042***0.004 
NPLit 1999–
2005 
0.0010.004 −0.007**0.003 −0.0060.004 
NPLit 2006–
2012 





−0.040***0.004 −0.046***0.004 −0.038***0.005 
NPLit 1999–
2005 
−0.007*0.004 −0.013***0.004 −0.008**0.004 
NPLit 2006–
2012 





−0.081***0.005 −0.059***0.004 −0.051***0.006 
RENPLit 1999–
2005 
−0.014***0.002 −0.008***0.003 −0.011***0.003 
RENPLit 2006–
2012 





−0.022***0.004 −0.020***0.005 −0.026***0.004 
CINPLit 1999–
2005 
−0.011*0.006 0.0020.006 −0.0010.006 
CINPLit 2006–
2012 





−0.008**0.004 −0.0010.001 −0.011***0.002 
CNPLit 1999–
2005 
−0.014*0.009 −0.0010.002 −0.022***0.005 
CNPLit 2006–
2012 
−0.0020.006 −0.013**0.006 −0.011*0.006 
 
Notes: All equations are estimated using a dynamic two-step system GMM estimator proposed by Blundell 
and Bond (1998) with Windmeijer's (2005) finite sample correction. Huber–White robust standard errors are 
reported in the parenthesis. ***, **, and * coefficients are statistically significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%, 
respectively. The detailed results with other explanatory variables are available from the authors upon 
request. 
6.3. Alternative methodologies and specifications 
Our findings are also robust when different econometric methodologies and model specifications are used. 
In particular, we tried (i) using first-difference GMM model to estimate models (1), (2), (3), (ii) using different 
model specifications by adding interaction dummies or dropping some of the explanatory variables from the 
main models, (iii) using alternative indicators for our credit risk determinants, (iv) using loan loss provisions 
instead of NPL as a proxy for credit risk. However, our key findings remained unchanged when these 
alternative approaches were used. The results are not reported here for the sake of brevity, but are 
available from the authors upon request. 
7. Concluding remarks 
The recent financial crisis in the United States highlights the key role that house prices play in destabilizing 
the financial system. In particular, falling house prices triggered a sharp increase in loan losses across U.S. 
banks, which in turn led to a severe macroeconomic downturn. Using a large panel of U.S. depository 
institutions over the period 1999–2012, we use dynamic panel data models to test three hypotheses 
regarding the relationship between house price fluctuations and NPL. 
With respect to Hypothesis 1, we detect a strong negative relationship between house price fluctuations 
and NPL, i.e., falling house prices are tightly linked to higher default rates. Furthermore, the relationship 
between house prices and credit risk is asymmetric, meaning that the impact of house price fluctuations on 
the evolution of NPL is stronger during adverse macroeconomic conditions. With respect to Hypothesis 2, 
we find that the impact of changes in house prices varies widely across different loan categories, with real 
estate loans being the most responsive loan category to the housing market conditions. The test of 
Hypothesis 3 reveals that different types of depository institutions react differently to the housing prices. In 
particular, our results show that CB are more sensitive to the house price movements during downturns. 
These findings have several important implications. First, regulators should consider house prices as a key 
macroprudential indicator in order to promote banking stability. In this context, it is of crucial importance to 
provide a framework to control the circular relationship between house prices, bank lending, and loan 
losses. On the one hand, it is essential to control the aggregate lending level in local housing markets to 
ensure smooth house price movements and to avoid the creation of housing bubbles. Our empirical results 
reveal that severe adverse house price movements can lead to a sharp increase in default rates. On the 
other hand, regulators should consistently monitor the exposure of depository institutions to the housing 
markets. In particular, any rapid shift in the combination of loan portfolios, especially towards real estate 
loans, can serve as a signal for a potential rise in subprime loans, which may eventually lead to high loan 
losses. 
Second, regulators should provide separate frameworks to examine the soundness of different loan 
categories. According to our empirical results, loan categories respond differently to both systematic and 
idiosyncratic factors. In particular, real estate loans are highly sensitive to house price fluctuations. 
Therefore, it is important to consistently control the quality of loan portfolios that contain a high portion of 
real estate loans, especially when there is a sharp rise in house prices. In fact, regulators can impose 
counter-cyclical capital buffers on the basis of the housing cycles to avoid severe liquidity shortages in the 
banking system when house prices drop. 
Finally, regulators should carefully monitor different factors that may induce a shift in bank lending 
behaviour. In particular, careful attention should be paid to any new behaviour that may lead to a sharp 
increase in real estate lending of CB. Compared to SI, CB are expected to have less expertise in mortgage 
lending as they are not mandated to concentrate on residential mortgages. Besides, CB may have better 
access to external funding as they are able to offer a wider range of financial products. Therefore, rising 
house prices and lending competition may encourage them to direct credits towards subprime borrowers, 
which may eventually lead to higher default rates. 
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1; Savings institutions include all U.S. savings banks and savings and loan associations. 
2; For a detailed discussion about differences between commercial banks and savings institutions see 
Madura (2014). 
3; Salas and Saurina (2002) suggest applying a logarithmic transformation on NPL to allow it to vary in the 
range (−∞, ∞). However, since NPL typically take values in the range (0, 0.10), such transformation is not 
very useful (Quagliariello, 2007). 
4; The concentration ratio is defined as the Herfindahl–Hirschman index (HHI) of three major loan 
categories in a bank: real estate loans, commercial and industrial loans, and consumer loans. If PLjit, j = 1, 
2, 3 represents the portfolio shares of the jth loan category, then HHIit = ∑(PLjit2) is defined as the HHI of 
bank i at time t. 
5; See Louzis et al. (2012) for a review of the determinants of NPL. 
6; Following the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) loan classification, we define (i) real estate 
loans as loans that are primarily secured by real estate; (ii) consumer loans as loans to individuals for 
personal expenditures; (iii) commercial and industrial loans as loans designed for commercial and industrial 
purposes. 
7; Weak instruments are uncorrelated with the error term but they are only weakly correlated with the 
endogenous variable. Weak instrument problem in the case of the first-differenced GMM estimator usually 
occurs when time series are persistent, (α → 1), and/or the relative variance of the fixed effects increases, 
(σμ2/σε2 → ∞). 
8; We also report robust standard errors to account for potential problems that may arise from 
heteroskedasticity and clustering of observations within banks while using the Windmeijer (2005) finite 
sample correction in our GMM models. 
9; We thank the anonymous referee for this insightful suggestion. 
10; The HPI is derived from data provided by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and is a measure of average 
house price changes in repeat sales or refinancings on the same single-family properties. 
11; Data on nominal GDP growth rate, interest rate, and house prices are adjusted for inflation by using 
national-level consumer price index data obtained from the International Financial Statistics (IFS) database. 
12; The deregulation process culminated in 1994 with the passage of the Interstate Banking and Branching 
Efficiency Act, which allowed banks to work across state borders without any formal authorization from 
state authorities. 
13; Due to lack of state-level NPL data, we do not conduct a separate analysis for interstate banks. 
14; Federally chartered savings institutions are currently allowed to extend their nonmortgage lending up to 
30% of their assets. 
15; We thank the anonymous referee for this valuable comment. 
16; Note that for other explanatory variables, the estimated coefficients are broadly similar to those 
presented in Section 5. The detailed results are available from the authors upon request. 
17; Note that for other explanatory variables, the estimated coefficients are broadly similar to those 
presented in Section 5. The detailed results are available from the authors upon request. 
 
